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Abstract	
 
Now	more	than	ever,	organizations	are	being	created	to	protect	the	
cyberspace	environment.	The	capability	of	cyber	organizations	tasked	to	defend	
critical	infrastructure	has	been	called	into	question	by	numerous	cybersecurity	
experts.	Organizational	theory	states	that	organizations	should	be	constructed	to	fit	
their	operating	environment	properly.	Little	research	in	this	area	links existing	
organizational	theory	to	cyber	organizational	structure.	Because	of	the	cyberspace	
connection	to	critical	infrastructure	assets,	the	factors	that	influence	the	structure	of	
cyber	organizations	designed	to	protect	these	assets	warrant	analysis	to	identify	
opportunities	for	improvement.	
This	thesis	analyzes	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	environment	
using	the	dominant	organizational	structure	theories.	By	using	multiple	case	study	
and	content	analysis,	2,856	sampling	units	are	analyzed	to	ascertain	the	level	of	
perceived	uncertainty	in	the	environment	(complexity,	dynamism,	and	
munificence).	The	results	indicate	that	the	general	external	environment	of	cyber	
organizations	tasked	to	protect	critical	infrastructure	is	highly	uncertain	thereby	
meriting	implementation	of	organic	structuring	principles.	
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CYBERSPACE	AND	ORGANIZATIONAL	STRUCTURE:		
AN	ANALYSIS	OF	THE	CRITICAL	INFRASTRUCTURE	ENVIRONMENT	
I.		Introduction	
Operational	Motivation	
In	his	book	Blink,	Gladwell	[27]	describes	the	ability	to	render	accurate	
expert	judgment	in	situations	(e.g.,	detecting	fraudulent	art	or	diagnosing	a	medical	
condition)	quickly	without	collecting	and	analyzing	mass	amounts	of	data.	Experts	
in	cyber	security,	using	techniques	described	by	Gladwell,	have	declared	that	
governments	are	not	prepared	to	respond	to	cyber‐attacks	[5,	10,	13,	36].	These	
experts,	understanding	critical	infrastructure	cyber	security,	inherently	know	that	
response	organizations	currently	in	place	are	ill‐fit	to	handle	a	crisis	that	may	be	
right	around	the	corner.	
The	organizations	that	are	supposed	to	defend	against	these	threats	(e.g.,	
Department	of	Homeland	Security	and	U.S.	Cyber	Command)	may	not	be	able	to	
resist	or	recover	from	a	persistent	cyber‐attack	[36,	59].	This	situation	is	
particularly	troubling	because	the	National	Security	Agency’s	Director	stated	that	
several	countries,	including	China	and	Russia,	have	the	cyber	capabilities	to	disrupt	
electrical	utilities	throughout	the	United	States	[53].	Without	necessarily	analyzing	
the	cyber	operating	environment,	experts	fully	understand	the	government	is	
modeling	current	cyber	defense	organizations	after	practically	every	other	
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government	organization	(e.g.,	rigid,	slow	to	change,	and	hierarchical).	Perhaps	the	
issues	these	organizations	face	are	foundational.	
As	Colquitt,	Lepine	and	Wesson	state,	almost	everything	in	organizational	
behavior	starts	with	structure	[16].	If	security	and	resilience	in	cyberspace	are	a	
goal,	then	an	analysis	of	structure	should	be	an	initial	primary	consideration.	
The	study	of	organizational	structure	is	largely	a	discipline	within	the	social	
sciences	and	championed	by	organizational	structure	theorists.	Over	the	last	fifty	
years,	this	area	of	research	has	grown	considerably.	Recent	theory	has	advanced	
significantly	from	the	division	of	labor	analyzed	by	Adam	Smith	and	Max	Weber.	It	
appears	that	once	stable	systems	are	now	rapidly	restructuring	in	uncertain	
emergent	global	markets,	marked	by	rapid	technological	change	and	tremendous	
competition.				
Personal	observations	while	assigned	to	the	headquarters	staff	for	an	Army	
organization	tasked	with	creating	a	new	cyber	unit	were	enlightening.	Numerous	
leaders	worked	furiously	to	find	out	the	best	way	to	accomplish	the	task.	Time	was	
limited.	The	pressure	to	be	ready	to	defend	the	network	was	great.	Attacks	on	
military	networks	were	growing	by	the	day.	This	situation	did	not	allow	for	slow	
and	deliberate	theoretical	analysis.	Rather,	it	created	a	cyber‐organization	solution	
whose	future	effectiveness	was	in	question.		
Situations	like	this	one	are	happening	everywhere	there	is	a	need	to	defend	
critical	cyber	assets.	The	urgency	of	the	circumstance	creates	the	need	for	
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immediate	action.	The	pervasiveness	of	information	technology	and	societies	
increasing	dependence	on	cyber	is	not	likely	to	resolve	quickly.	Indeed	a	couple	of	
decades	ago	Ilinitch,	D’Aveni	and	Lewin	claimed	about	this	new	environment,	
“Although	numerous	organizations	are	being	created,	few	are	examining	the	
organizational	research	and	many	are	experimenting	with	disaster”	[32].	This	thesis	
seeks	to	fill	the	gap	in	the	literature	to	address	this	critical	issue.		
Research	Questions		
This	thesis	analyzes	relevant	organizational	structure	theory	and	its	
connection	to	cyber	organizations	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:		
1. What	is	organizational	structure?	
2. What	theories	contribute	to	organizational	structure?	
3. How	should	organizations	structure	in	cyber	environments?	
Methodology	
The	research	approach	is	qualitative,	pragmatic,	and	exploratory	in	nature,	
using	multiple	case	study	and	content	analysis.	The	environment	of	cyber‐connected	
critical	infrastructure,	defined	as	critical	infrastructure	that	connects	to	cyberspace	
(primarily	the	internet),	will	be	evaluated	from	the	perspective	of	the	academic,	
governmental	and	private/practitioner	communities.	Documents	provide	the	
information	for	analysis.	Content	analysis	categorizes	and	quantifies	the	level	of	
uncertainty	in	the	environment.		
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Limitations	
Limitations	ranged	from	software	functionality	to	method	selection.	
Significant	software	limitations	included	the	lack	of	flexibility	in	software	
modification,	and	user	licenses	requiring	each	coder	to	have	their	copy	of	the	
software.	The	researcher	limited	the	cases	to	the	cyber‐connected	critical	
infrastructure	environment	(though	the	nature	of	cyber	closely	links	this	research	
with	other	cyber	environments),	and	the	search	engines	to	eight	sources.	
Documentation,	provided	by	the	search	engines	for	the	data	set,	were	(in	some	
cases)	limited;	not	all	information	on	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	
environment	is	available	and	some	required	subscriptions.	The	availability	of	
personnel	with	knowledge	of	the	phenomena,	the	appropriate	reading	level,	and	
coding	expertise	was	limited.	Human	coding	suffered	natural	limitations	from	the	
ambiguity	of	word	meaning	to	fatigue.	The	multiple	case	study	approach	with	
multiple	strata	was	used	to	overcome	data	triangulation	(multiple	data	collection	
techniques,	e.g.,	surveys,	interviews).	This	research	used	appropriate	techniques	to	
mitigate	these	limitations	and	others	(e.g.,	rest,	training)	
Implications	
Theory	dictates	that	organizations	should	structure	to	fit	their	operating	
environment.	The	insights	of	this	analysis	should	help	strategic	cyber	leaders,	
particularly	those	tasked	to	protect	critical	infrastructure,	understand	critical	
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aspects	of	the	environment.	The	connections	made	between	structure	and	
environment	will	aid	in	structuring	more	effective	cyber	response	organizations.		
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II.		Literature	Review	
Structuring	Organizations	
When	discussing	organizational	structure,	it	is	helpful	to	define	the	meaning	
of	“organizational	structure.”	Many	people,	when	hearing	organizational	structure,	
will	conjure	up	a	picture	of	an	organizational	chart	of	some	sort.	However,	
organizational	structure	encompasses	far	more	than	a	chart.	Organizational	
structure	commonly	breaks	into	two	dimensions:	structural	and	contextual	[17,	50].	
These	dimensions	help	explain	the	forms	organizations	take	and	why	they	take	
them.	The	structural	dimensions	include	how	organizations	attempt	to	control	
behavior	and	complete	tasks.	Contextual	dimensions,	often	called	contingencies,	are	
forces	acting	within	and	outside	the	organization,	which	aﬀect	the	structural	
dimensions.	Table	1	displays	some	of	the	significant	structural	and	contextual	
dimensions.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 7 
 
 
Table	1.		Structural	Dimensions	of	Organizations	
Type	 Dimensions	 Traits	
Structural	 Specialization;	centralization;	
formalization;	span	of	
control;	chain	of	command;	
personal	specialty.	
How	many	tasks	in	a	 job;	who	has	
the	authority	 to	make	decisions	and	
where;	how	standardized	and	
explicit	are	the	rules,	policies	and	
procedures;	how	many	people	are	
supervised	 in	a	particular	group;	
who	reports	to	whom	up	the	
hierarchy;	what	is	everyone	
required	to	know.	
Contextual	 Size;	strategy;	culture;	
external	and	internal	
environment	(competition,	
hostility,	geography);	
technology.	
What	size	is	the	organization	and	its	
subunits;	what	choices	are	being	
made	by	leadership;	perceived	
values	and	beliefs;	what	is	
happening	in	and	around	the	
organization	which	can	aﬀect	it;	the	
presence	and	eﬀects	of	technology.	
	
This	thesis	will	explore	these	dimensions	to	determine	their	implication	for	
structuring	organizations	to	operate	in	cyberspace.	What	follows	is	a	review	of	the	
dominant	theoretical	principles.	
Organizational	Structure	Theory	
The	study	of	the	existence	of	organizations	and	how	to	sustain	that	existence	
has	increased	dramatically	in	the	last	75	years	[49].	The	rise	and	ubiquitous	nature	
of	information	technology	and	its	eﬀects	on	organizational	structure	theory	in	the	
social	sciences	have	led	to	proportionately	rapid	theory	development	[45].	Few	
could	foresee	the	universality	and	importance	of	technological	systems.	The	four	
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dominant,	historical	theories	on	organizational	structure	are	(i)	institutional,	(ii)	
resource	dependence,	(iii)	population	ecology,	and	(iv)	structural	contingency.	
Institutional	Theory.	
Dimaggio	and	Powell	introduced	institutional	theory	(or	institutional	
isomorphism)	in	1983.	The	crux	of	this	theory	can	be	summed	up	rather	simply	–	
organizations	tend	to	mimic	each	other	[20].	Dimaggio	and	Powell	point	to	three	
main	types	of	isomorphism,	which	are	coercive,	mimetic	and	normative.	Coercion	
explains	how	organizations	often	result	in	similar	structures	because	of	similar	
external	environmental	pressures	(e.g.,	government	oversight).	Mimetic	explains	
how	organizations	in	established	fields	tend	to	mimic	each	other	as	a	bulwark	
against	uncertainty.	Normative	isomorphic	processes	result	from	the	
professionalization	of	a	field	accompanied	by	common	training,	standards	and	
practices,	which	create	homogeneity	[20].	It	is	important	to	note,	that	in	the	cyber‐
connected	critical	infrastructure	environment,	institutional	isomorphism	may	not	
be	helpful.	Observation	of	government	cyber	structuring	in	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Defense	indicates	the	presence	of	isomorphism.	For	example,	newly	created	cyber	
forces	closely	resemble	traditional	military	forces,	even	though	there	are	critical	
diﬀerences	in	the	environments	of	each.	
Resource	Dependence	Theory.	
Resource	dependence	theory	argues	organizational	survival	be	about	
acquiring	and	maintaining	resources	[49].	There	is	considerable	overlap	between	
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resource	dependence	and	population	ecology.	However,	there	are	several	
deviations;	some	examples	are	in	the	roles	of	information	processing	and	strategic	
choice.	Population	ecology	argues	that,	given	certain	conditions,	strategic	choice	is	
possible.	However,	most	organizations	are	often	powerless	to	choose	because	of	
inter‐organizational	dependencies	and	information	processing	issues	[1].	Resource	
dependence	counters	by	oﬀering	that	information	systems	determine	organizational	
choice	and	provide	critical	information	[49].	Understanding	what	constitutes	a	
resource	in	cyber	is	diﬃcult.	However,	some	general	examples	include	money	and	
people.	
Population	Ecology	Theory.	
Population	ecology	offers	explanations	based	on	the	natural	selection	model.	
Aldrich	and	Pfeﬀer	argue	in	the	Environment	of	Organizations	that	organizations	
change	because	of	the	distribution	of	resources	in	the	organization’s	environment	
[3].	The	environment	selects	the	organizational	form,	which	demands	a	constant	
sense	of	adaptation.	The	list	of	once	successful	organizations	that	did	not	adapt	to	
the	environment	and	quickly	found	themselves	obsolete	is	long.	Government	cyber	
organizations	can	ill	aﬀord	to	be	a	part	of	this	group.	A	consistent	theme	is	
developing	in	the	alignment	of	the	environment	and	the	organization.	Structural	
adaptation	and	flexible	structuring	in	high	information	technology	industries	are	
now	prominent.	
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Structural	Contingency	Theory.	
This	theory	oﬀers	a	potential	synthesis	of	ideas	represented	in	the	theories	
above.	Structural	contingency	theory	declares	the	most	eﬀective	organizational	
structure	is	the	one	which	best	“fits”	the	contingencies	[22].	Inherent	in	this	
definition	is	that	structure	should	be	tailored.	Donaldson	[23]	states	that	certain	
factors	influence	structure.	These	factors	(known	as	contingency	factors)	include	
technology,	size,	strategy	and	the	environment	[23,	47].	Most	contingencies	involve	
the	internal	boundary	of	the	organization,	but	some	of	the	most	critical	are	outside	
of	that	boundary	(e.g.,	the	external	environment).	Contingency	theory	offers	several	
empirically	verified	results	that	show	organizations	that	fit	the	contingencies	
present	in	the	environment	outperform	those	who	do	not	[23].	It	is	important	to	
note	that	rarely	does	an	organization	have	to	address	one	contingency	and	not	
others,	making	radical	organizational	overhauls	preferable	to	prolonged	
incremental	steps	[51].	Heuristically,	it	is	also	desirable	to	make	these	changes	
earlier	in	the	life	of	an	organization	than	later,	which	bodes	well	for	cyber	
organizations,	as	they	are	in	their	infancy.	
Contingencies	
Building	upon	contingency	theory,	what	follows	is	a	brief	review	of	the	
central	contingencies	in	the	research	literature	and	their	relevance	to	the	cyber	
environment.	
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Technology.	
Technology	and	the	change	surrounding	it	increase	perceived	uncertainty	for	
organizations	[55].	As	uncertainty	increases	so	does	the	pressure	to	learn	and	
increase	knowledge.	This	pressure	for	knowledge	creates	new	work	roles,	
workflows,	and	even	changes	the	language	used	to	describe	work	[55].	The	focus	is	
not	whether	organizations	will	use	information	technology	to	accomplish	
something,	but	how	they	will	accomplish	things	within	and	around	it.	Cyber	
organizations	should	keep	these	principles	in	mind,	and	be	careful	not	to	design	
structures	that	are	comfortable	but	inappropriate.	
Size.	
Size	considerably	aﬀects	the	type	and	classification	of	an	organization	[47].	
Organizational	size	has	been	found	to	aﬀect	nearly	everything	that	defines	
organizational	structure.	For	instance,	larger	organizations	are	often	more	complex,	
have	more	formalization	and	survive	longer	than	smaller	organizations	[7].	
Information	technology‐rich	environments	have	been	shown	to	reduce	organization	
size	as	information	systems	replace	middle	management	and	allow	other	
organizations	to	increase	in	size	without	decreasing	eﬃciency	and	innovativeness	
[19].	It	is	important	to	note	that	eﬃciency	has	not	been	shown	to	improve	as	
organizational	size	increases	[28].	Collyer	[15]	states	that	as	the	size	of	the	project	
increases	so	does	the	chance	of	failure.	The	likelihood	of	that	failure	is	compounded	
by	increased	speed	and	quantity	of	change	in	the	environment.	The	consensus	
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appears	to	be	forming	wherein	larger	organizations	form	right‐sized	subunits	that	
perform	well	when	based	on	the	relevant	factors.	
Strategy	and	Strategic	Choice.	
The	type	of	strategy	an	organization	pursues	significantly	aﬀects	the	
structure	of	organizations	[1,	12,	23,	47].	Perhaps	most	importantly,	when	
organizations	choose	a	strategy	to	match	structure	to	the	relevant	contingencies,	
performance	increases	[21].	This	is	a	strategy	cyber	organizations	should	pursue.	
Environment.	
In	line	with	the	population	ecology	and	resource	dependence	perspectives,	
organizations	that	cannot	adapt	to	their	environment	cannot	survive	[33].	
Environmental	contingencies	are	fundamentally	important	to	organizations.	They	
are	of	particular	importance	to	cyber	organizations,	which	have	a	principal	security	
function.	It	is	helpful	to	separate	the	internal	environment	of	organizations	from	the	
external	environment	of	organizations.	This	research	will	exclusively	focus	on	the	
general	external	environment,	here	defined	as	the	relevant	physical	and	social	
factors	outside	the	boundaries	of	an	organization	[24]	which	generally	eﬀect	all	
within	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	area.	Limited	research	connecting	
organizational	structure	to	the	cyberspace	environment	is	available.	However,	
research	is	beginning	to	emerge	on	organizational	operations	in	a	cyber‐
environment.	For	example,	Liu	et	al.,	[41]	have	addressed	command	and	control	in	
cyber‐physical‐social	systems	(CPSS).	However,	Liu’s	research	focuses	far	more	on	
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the	potential	capabilities	of	CPSS	and	far	less	on	optimal	structural	dimensions	for	
those	operating	in	cyberspace.	
The	presence	of	competition	and	hostility	in	the	environment	can	
significantly	affect	organizations.	For	example,	if	an	organization	perceives	their	
environment	to	be	hostile	or	competitive,	it	will	move	toward	centralization	and	
formalization	[34,	48].	This	reaction	may	be	instinctive.	However,	it	can	lead	to	a	
structure	that	is	ill‐suited	to	meet	the	challenging	characteristics	of	the	
environment.	This	phenomenon	is	insightful	in	light	of	newly	created	government	
cyber	organizations.	It	appears	centralization	and	formalization	are	increasing	in	
these	organizations	conceivably	to	their	peril.	
Each	organizational	environment	has	unique	extrinsic	factors.	These	factors	
influence	organizational	shape,	means	and	actions	within	the	environment	[11].	In	
assessing	environmental	considerations,	uncertainty	emerges	as	a	focal	point	[11,	
24,	39].	
Environmental	Uncertainty	
Dynamism,	complexity	and	munificence	remain	the	primary	dimensions	used	
to	conceptualize	the	central	properties	of	organization	environments	[7,	18,	25]	and	
act	as	significant	measures	of	perceived	uncertainty	in	the	external	environment	[1,	
24,	25].	These	three	dimensions	relate	to	forces	in	the	environment	that	can	
influence	the	organization.	Force	is	operationally	defined	as	an	entity	external	to	
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cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	organizations	that	can	eﬀect	change	in	their	
environment.	These	forces	can	be	competitors,	customers,	economic,	technological,	
political,	ethical,	demographic,	cultural	and	social	[17,	24,	57].	Note	that	while	
complexity,	dynamism	and	munificence	are	capable	of	providing	an	extensive	view	
of	the	environment,	they	are	not	the	only	determinants	of	environmental	eﬀects	on	
structure	[31].	
Complexity.	
Complexity	relates	to	the	total	amount	of	forces	in	the	environment,	whether	
they	are	connecting	with	each	other,	and	the	degree	by	which	they	can	influence	
other	organizations.	For	example,	a	weak	force	in	isolation	lowers	uncertainty,	
whereas	many	interconnecting	strong	forces	increase	uncertainty	[2,	18,	24].	
Dynamism	(Turbulence).	
Dynamism	refers	to	change	measured	in	speed	and	quantity.	Organizations	
that	face	a	significant	amount	of	change	operate	in	environments	that	are	more	
uncertain.	Organizations	that	experience	small	amounts	of	change	have	less	
uncertainty.	An	increased	rate	or	speed	of	change	only	adds	to	the	uncertainty	[2,	
18,	24].	
Munificence	(Resource).	
Munificence	deals	with	capacity,	or	more	generally,	the	amount	of	resources	
available	to	sustain	or	support	that	environment.	This	category	represents	a	
considerable	portion	of	the	focus	of	structural	theory.	As	it	pertains	to	uncertainty,	
 15 
 
 
the	scarcer	the	resources,	the	greater	the	uncertainty	[2,	18,	47].	Figure	1	
conceptually	depicts	munificence,	complexity	and	dynamism	as	sources	of	
uncertainty	in	the	external	environment.	
	
	
	
Figure	1.			The	External	Environment	and	Uncertainty	
	
Structures	
The	mechanistic	and	organic	structural	continuum	represents	the	type	of	
forms	organizations	can	take[11].	This	continuum	oﬀers	two	extremes	for	
management	systems	based	on	the	level	of	perceived	uncertainty	in	the	
environment.	Empirical	results	strongly	indicate	that	perceived	environmental	
uncertainty	significantly	correlates	with	organic	and	mechanistic	structural	types.	
Table	2	lists	characteristics	of	the	two	structures.	
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Table	2.		Characteristics	of	Mechanistic	and	Organic	Structures	
Mechanistic	 Organic	
Specialized	individual	 tasks	
Vertical	hierarchy	
Individual	responsibility	
Centralized	 authority	
Increased	rules,	policies	and	procedures	
Standardized	vertical	communication	
Directives	and	orders	
Fixed	 functional	departments	
Status	increases	up	hierarchy	
Narrow	span	of	control	
Adjustable	 team	tasks	
Flexible	 (flatter)	structure	
Team	 responsibility	
Decentralized	authority	
Decreased	formalization	
All‐encompassing	communication	
Advice	 and	information	sharing	
Fluid	 (mixed)	functional	departments
Status	 increases	with	brilliance	
Wide	 span	of	control	
	
Mechanistic	and	Organic	in	Practice	
Two	organizations	are	used	as	examples	to	demonstrate	mechanistic	and	
organic	structures.	The	U.S.	Army	is	used	to	typify	mechanistic	structures;	Apache	
Indians,	Anonymous	and	Al	Qaeda	display	examples	of	organic	structures.	
Mechanistic	Organization:	U.S.	Army.	
An	Army	infantry	division	represents	an	organization	that	displays	
mechanistic	characteristics.	While	not	all	of	the	Army	trends	toward	mechanistic,	
most	of	the	Army	easily	fits	this	structure.	A	typical	division	is	largely	mechanistic	
when	analyzing	its	dimensional	traits.	
This	particular	type	of	structure	is	common	throughout	the	Army	regardless	
of	the	environment	and	context	in	which	it	conducts	business.	Recent	combat	
operations	in	Iraq	are	an	example.	During	the	initial	campaign,	Army	divisions	were	
deployed	to	dominate	the	environment	with	mass	resources,	against	a	singular,	
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weaker	and	mechanistic	adversary.	As	the	war	matured	and	kinetic	operations	
diminished,	the	Army	found	its	divisional	structure	ill‐suited	for	nation	building,	and	
struggled	to	find	the	flexibility	to	adjust	amidst	the	growing	dynamics	and	
complexities	(e.g.,	environmental	uncertainty)	of	a	counterinsurgency	[4].	This	
experience	serves	to	highlight	the	need	for	flexible	organizational	modification	
processes.	Table	3	depicts	the	structural	dimensions	of	a	typical	infantry	division.	
	
Table	3.		U.S.	Army	Infantry	Division	Structure	
Dimension	 Trait	 Structure	
Specialization	 Highly	specialized	down	to	the	individual	
through	task	lists;	highly	functional	and	
compartmentalized	into	subunits.	
Mechanistic	
Centralization	 Authority	to	make	decisions	is	often	kept	at	
multiple	levels	above	the	worker.	
Mechanistic	
Formalization	 Highly	formalized	tasks	driven	by	doctrine,	
codified	and	checked	frequently;	dozens	of	
policies	and	procedures	dictate	actions.	
Mechanistic	
Span	of	Control	 The	amount	of	personnel	supervised	is	
doctrinally	 driven	and	rigid;	often	a	narrow	
and	vertical	hierarchy;	diﬃcult	to	change.	
Mechanistic	
Chain	of	
Command	
Doctrinally	 driven	and	considerably	vertical	
often	with	a	dozen	leaders	with	authority	 to	
change	what	the	lowest	individual	will	do.	
Mechanistic	
Professionalism	 Varied	with	deliberate	intentions	of	being	
high	throughout	the	Army.	
Mixed‐Organic	
Status	 Increases	up	the	hierarchy.	 Mechanistic	
Communication	 More	vertical	 than	 all	 encompassing;	directive	
and	orders	based.	
Mechanistic	
	
	 The	means	of	creating	an	Army	organization	offers	some	explanation	as	to	
why	they	are	mechanistic.		
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Creating	Mechanistic	Organizations.	
The	Army	creates	organizations	through	the	Force	Development	Process	
which	“consists	of	defining	military	capabilities,	designing	force	structures	to	
provide	these	capabilities,	and	translating	organizational	concepts	based	on	
doctrine,	technologies,	materiel,	manpower	requirements,	and	limited	resources	
into	a	trained	and	ready	Army”	[56].	
There	are	five	phases	in	the	Force	Development	Process,	and	they	are:		
(1)	Develop	capabilities.	
(2)	Design	organizations.	
(3)	Develop	organizational	models.	
(4)	Determine	organizational	authorizations.	
(5)	Document	organizational	authorizations.	
	 Army	organizations	follow	this	process,	to	include	Army	cyber	
organizations.	This	five‐step	process	results	in	the	creation	of	an	organizational	
structure.	Figure	3	shows	the	model	of	the	system	of	systems	process	with	the	
inputs	and	outputs.	
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Once	the	Army	identifies	the	requirement	for	a	new	organization,	the	
planning,	programming,	budgeting,	and	execution	(PPBE)	process	begins	to	develop	
the	organization.	The	process	map	in	Figure	4	highlights	the	key	steps.	
 
Figure	2.	Army	Force	Development	Process	(AR	71‐32)	[56]		
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Recieve	Guidance	from...
•National	Security	Strategy,	National	Military	
Strategy,	Quadrennial	Defense	Review,	National	
Defense	Strategy,	Defense	Planning	Guidance,	
Guidance	for	Development	of	the	Force,		Global	
Force	Management	Implementation	Guidance,	
Guidance	from	the	Army’s	senior	leadership	(The	
Army	Plan),	Joint	warfighting	concepts	(such	as	
rapid	decisive,	operations,	peace	enforcement	
operations),	and/or	new	materiel	capabilities	
evolving	from	the	research,	development,	and	
acquisition	process.
then..
•The	capabilities	development	community	
develops	the	proposed	organization,	designs,	
missions,	and	functions	to	meet	the	required	
operational	capabilities,	which	is	captured	in	
a	Unit	Reference	Sheet	(URS).
then...
•Training	and	Doctrine	Command	
(TRADOC)	utilizes	the	Army	Capabilities	
Integration	Center	(ARCIC)	and	proponent	
centers	and	schools	to	develop	and	analyze	
the	design.
then...
•The	approved	URS	design	moves	forward	to	ARCIC’s	
Force	Design	Directorate	and	the	Architecture	
Integration	and	Management	Division	who	makes	
sure	the	proposed	organizational	design	fits	
throughout	the	Army	and	that	the	proposal	is	
doctrinally	correct.
then...
•Force	Design	Directorate	forwards	their	
design	to	the	commanding	general	of	
training	and	doctrine	command	for	
approval.
then...
•Approved	recommendations	are	forwarded	to	
Deputy	Chief	of	Staff	Director	of	Force	
Managment	for	a	force	integration	functional	
areas	analysis.
then...
•The	Force	design	update	needs	to	be	
approved	by	the	Vice	Chief	of	Staff,	Army	or	
Chief	of	Staff,	Army.
then...
•The	US	Army	Force	Managment	Support	Agency,	
in	conjunction	with	the	appropriate	force	
management	proponent,	applies	architecture,	
rules,	standards,	and	guidance	to	the	doctrinally	
correct	design	to	produce	the	organizational	
model.	
then...
•Headquarters	Department	of	the	Army	
Approves	the	model	known	as	a	
Military	Table	of	Orgranization	and	
Equipment.
then...
•The	organization	is	submitted	to	the	total	army	
analysis	(TAA)	process	to	compete	for	resources	to	
perform	the	specified	capabilities	it	was	created	to	do.	
Resourcing	varies.
Figure	3.		Process	Map	for	Creating	Army	Organizations 
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The	process	map	does	not	show	all	of	the	process.	For	instance,	the	Army	will	
still	need	to	purchase	equipment,	requisition	personnel,	prep	sites,	and	publish	
doctrine.	All	of	this	happens	within	the	confines	of	what	has	occurred	previously.	
This	process	does	not	happen	quickly.	Senior	leader	approval	can	cause	bottlenecks	
(there	are	many	in	this	example),	transitions	from	one	organization	to	another,	
rework,	or	additions/modifications	from	approving	officials.	Leaders	often	change,	
which	creates	stagnation	in	the	process.	Several	other	factors	and	variables	cause	
delay	to	include	embedded	subprocesses.	All	of	this	adds	up	to	an	organizational	
creation	process	facilitating	mechanistic	entities.	Perhaps	the	most	significant	point	
is	that	the	Army	evaluates	structural	context	to	determine	needed	capabilities,	not	
to	determine	structural	strategy.	
Organic	Organizations:	Apache	Indians,	Anonymous	and	Al	Qaeda.	
The	Apache	Indians,	Anonymous	Cyber	Network,	and	Al	Qaeda	oﬀer	
examples	of	organic	structuring	in	a	nearly	pure	form.	These	three	organizations	
exhibited	an	unusual	ability	to	succeed	against	vastly	larger	adversaries;	they	
operate	in	highly	uncertain	environments,	characterized	by	sudden	and	vast	
amounts	of	change,	considerable	forces	that	are	prone	to	shift	at	a	moment’s	notice,	
and	limited	availability	of	resources.	Table	4	depicts	the	structural	dimensions	of	
these	organizations.	
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Table	4.		Apache	Indians,	Anonymous	Hacker	Group	and	Al	Qaeda	Structures	
Dimension	 Trait	 Structure	
Specialization	 Low	level	of	specialization	with	operators	
performing	a	broad	range	of	random	tasks	
with	little	 standardization;	fluid	team	and	
network‐based	task	units.	
Organic	
Centralization	 Personnel	follow	emergent	leaders	and	often	
act	with	autonomy.	
Organic	
Formalization	 Frequently	no	formalization	is	present	in	the	
performance	of	tasks.	
Organic	
Span	of	Control	 Emergent	and	varied;	at	 times	extraordinarily	
wide.	
Organic	
Chain	of	
Command	
Emergent	and	flexible	based	on	contingencies	
facing	subunits;	near	flat	 organizational	
hierarchy	with	common	themes	allowing	
various	actors	to	plug	into	the	organization	
when	needed	or	desired.	
Organic	
Professionalism	 Varied. 	 Mixed	
Status	 Increases	with	displayed	brilliance.	 Organic	
Communication	 Ranges	from	horizontal	to	all	encompassing;	
advice	and	information	sharing.	
Organic	
	
The	Apache	Indians	have	occupied	what	are	now	northern	Mexico	and	the	
southwestern	United	States	for	hundreds	of	years.	They	increased	in	fame	and	
notoriety	during	the	era	of	Spanish	Conquistadors	in	the	Americas	in	the	16th	
century.	The	Spanish	appeared	to	be	unstoppable	as	they	gained	considerable	
ground	throughout	Central	America	until	they	ventured	north	and	encountered	the	
Apache.	The	Spanish	met	their	match	in	an	undersized	and	under‐resourced	
adversary	[9].	
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The	anonymous	hacker	group	is	similar.	They	clashed	with	Fortune	500	
companies,	computer	security	firms,	major	religious	organizations	and	brought	
them,	at	least	temporarily,	great	diﬃculty	[44].	
		 Al	Qaeda	has	very	noticeably	kept	powerful	militaries	busy	for	over	a	decade.	
They	have	done	so	using	simple	technology	and	sneaky	tactics	to	make	up	for	their	
lack	of	air	support,	advanced	communications	and	weaponry.	There	is	a	
commonality	in	these	three	organizations	and	their	adversaries.	All	of	their	
adversaries	exhibited	tendencies	to	structure	and	operate	in	a	mechanistic	fashion	
despite	external	environmental	conditions	that	suggest	the	opposite.		
Creating	Organic	Organizations.	
Describing	the	creation	of	these	and	other	organic	organizations	is	difficult;	
they	are,	almost	by	definition,	unstructured.	However,	Burns	and	Stalker	highlight	
the	presence	of	three	factors	in	the	creation	of	organic	structures:	shared	beliefs	and	
goals,	commitment	to	a	common	concern,	and	personnel	with	expertise	who	emerge	
as	leaders	[11].	Table	5	shows	the	presence	of	these	factors.		
	
Table	5.		Structural	Factors	Present	in	Creating	Organic	Organizations	
Organization	 Shared	
beliefs/goals	
Common	concern	 Emergent	leaders	
16th	Century	
Apache	Indians	
Yes	 Repelling	the	Spanish	
invasion	
Nant’ans	
Anonymous	
Hacker	Group	
Yes	 Varies	on	emergent	
“operations”	of	interest
Ops	champion;	
skilled	hackers	
Al	Qaeda	 Yes	 Repel	the	west;	
establish	a	caliphate	
Commanders/emirs	
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The	strength	of	the	factors	appears	to	increase	the	strength	of	the	
organization.	When	beliefs	and	goals	begin	to	compete	with	one	another,	this	can	
create	opposing	factions,	effectively	reducing	the	collective	power	of	the	entity.	A	
common	concern	acts	to	focus	the	horizontal	structure,	which	creates	the	impetus	
for	more	skilled	leaders	to	champion	it.	Weakening	the	common	concern	likewise	
weakens	the	integration	of	existing	groups.	Followers	choose	leadership	based	on	
proven	effectiveness	in	the	area	of	interest.	The	absence	of	skilled	leaders	hinders	
the	ability	of	the	organization	to	accomplish	goals.	In	the	case	of	the	Apache,	leaders	
are	known	as	Nant’ans,	spiritual	and	cultural	front‐runners	people	liked	following	
[9].	There	were	many	Nant’ans,	and	they	would	at	times	align	with	each	other	when	
needed.	When	one	died,	another	would	emerge.	Figure	5	is	a	depiction	of	horizontal	
and	network‐based	nature	of	the	Apache	Indians	in	the	16th	century:		
	
 	
Nant’an	
Nant’anNant’an
Nant’an
Figure	4.		Apache	Structural	Depiction 
 25 
 
 
Structure	and	Environmental	Uncertainty	Synthesis	
As	it	relates	to	performance,	the	greater	the	perceived	uncertainty	in	the	
environment,	the	more	the	organization	should	take	an	organic	form,	and	with	less	
uncertainty,	they	undertake	a	mechanistic	form	[11,	29,	39].	When	an	organization	
takes	an	organic	form	in	an	environment	that	is	highly	uncertain,	this	is	considered	
a	structural	fit,	which	is	shown	to	increase	performance	[21].	This	alignment	seems	
intuitive,	as	organic	structures	are	more	fluid	and	adaptable.	Following	the	same	
logic,	organic	structures	are	not	as	helpful	in	stable	environments.	It	is	worth	noting	
that	no	single	contingency	or	structure	applies	to	all.	Organic	or	mechanistic	
structural	types	are	only	“better”	if	they	fit	the	contingencies.	Organizational	
structures	and	their	relationship	to	environmental	uncertainty	and	structural	
contingency	can	be	synthesized	as	shown	in	Figure	2.	
	
	 This	research	seeks	to	find	out	the	level	of	uncertainty	in	the	general	external	
environment	of	cyber	connected	critical	infrastructure	to	determine	structural	
guidance	for	cyber	organizations	tasked	with	protecting	these	critical	assets.	
Figure	5:		Organizational	Structure,	Uncertainty	and	the	External	Environment	
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III.		Methodology	
Research	Design	and	Methodology	
The	research	method	is	a	multiple	case	study.	The	approach	is	structured	as	
an	exploratory	study	with	a	retrospective	lens	for	organizational	patterns.	The	case	
study	method	allows	investigators	to	retain	the	holistic	and	meaningful	
characteristics	of	real‐life	events	such	as	individual	life	cycles,	small	group	behavior,	
organizational	and	managerial	processes	and	the	maturation	of	industries	[60].	
The	data	analysis	technique	is	content	analysis.	Content	analysis	is	suitable	
for	condensing	many	words	within	a	document	into	a	small	set	of	content	categories	
based	on	explicit	coding	rules	for	the	purpose	of	examining	them	[6,	30,	37,	54].	The	
content	categories	were	established	a	priori	based	the	organizational	structure	
theories	of	population	ecology,	resource	dependence	and	structural	contingency.	
The	categories	were	defined	iteratively	to	maximize	mutual	exclusivity	and	
exhaustiveness	[58].	This	research	highlights	external	environmental	uncertainty	
for	its	significant	influence	in	shaping	organizational	structure	across	the	following	
three	measured	dimensional	categories:	(i)	complexity;	(ii)	dynamism	(turbulence);	
and,	(iii)	munificence	(resource)	[18].	
Data	Collection	
Once	external	environmental	uncertainty	was	chosen	as	the	focus	of	this	
research,	the	content	analyst	was	able	to	draw	a	stratified	purposive	sample	of	
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artifacts	(documents)	from	the	published	material.	The	strata	(cases)	divided	into	
academia,	government	and	private/practitioner	[43,	46].	Each	represents	
stakeholders	of	publicly	available	information	related	to	critical	infrastructure	and	
cyber	in	the	United	States.	Information	about	the	cyber	linkage	to	critical	
infrastructure	is	a	specific	topic	of	interest	where	relevant	information	is	known	
mostly	to	a	specific	subset	of	professionals	within	these	three	strata	[37].	Search	
engines	(including	Google,	RAND/CSIS/MITRE	and	.gov	sources)	identified	the	
artifacts	using	algorithms	that	sort	document	retrieval	from	large	databases.	This	
process	helps	to	identify	artifacts	with	the	most	references	and	information	related	
to	critical	infrastructure	and	cyber.	The	U.S.	Government	Accountability	Oﬃce’s	
(GAO)	definition	of	artifacts	as	physically	separable,	minimally	sized,	and	self‐
contained	textual	information	was	adopted	[30].	
Artifact	Discrimination.	
Artifacts	were	retrieved	using	the	search	terms	industrial	control	system,	
SCADA,	and	critical	infrastructure	cyber,	based	on	their	close	linkage	to	cyber‐
connected	critical	infrastructure	[8].	The	initial	search	harvested	a	large	number	of	
artifacts.	In	filtering	the	results,	additional	criteria	were	applied	to	achieve	a	
relevant	and	representative	sample	for	each	stratum.	Table	6	lists	the	criteria.	The	
content	analyst	converted	the	final	selection	of	artifacts	(Appendix	A)	into	
individual	portable	document	format	(PDF)	to	minimize	the	file	size,	standardize	the	
format	for	all	coders,	and	make	importing	into	coding	software	(e.g.,	Maxqda)	easy.		
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Table	6.		Artifact	Criteria	
Category	 Criteria	
Content	 Discuss	cyber	and	the	critical	infrastructure	general	
external	environment	
Geography	 U.S.	related	
Timeliness	 Published	within	the	last	seven	years	(since	July	2008)	
Availability	 Publicly	available	
Size	 No	more	than	20	codeable	pages	per	document	
	
Table	7	contains	the	search	results.	More	artifacts	that	are	academic	were	
reviewed	because	of	their	perceived	reliability,	validity	and	trust.	A	slightly	higher	
amount	of	private/practitioner	artifacts	were	reviewed	than	government	because	of	
search	engine	limitations	unique	to	RAND,	CSIS	and	MITRE.	Google’s	platform	
dominated	by	its	ability	to	return	results	concentrated	on	the	focus	area,	which	was	
very	timely	(usually	within	one	year	of	publication).	Government	artifact	selection	
also	suﬀered	from	search	engine	limitations	and	syntactic	issues	(e.g.,	included	only	
minutes	from	congressional	meetings)	that	increased	the	amount	of	artifacts	needed	
to	be	viewed.	
	
Table	7.		Artifact	Retrieval	Results	
Strata	 Initial	Sample	 Met	Criteria	 Final	Random	Sample
Academia	 91	 34	 10	(50%)	
Private/	Practitioner	 73	 17	 5	(25%)	
Government	 65	 17	 5	(25%)	
Totals	 229	 68	 20		(n=60)	
	
Artifacts	were	randomized	using	Microsoft	Excel	to	generate	the	final	sample.	
All	68	artifacts	(Appendix	B)	meeting	the	selection	criterion	were	coded	with	an	A,	
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P,	G	(academic,	private/practitioner,	and	government).	The	final	random	sample	
contained	20	documents	per	coder	(distributed	10‐A/5‐P/5‐G)	for	a	total	of	n=60	
documents.	It	is	important	to	note	that	in	content	analysis,	unlike	quantitative	
statistical	analysis,	an	accurate	representation	of	all	the	documents	in	the	area	of	
cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	is	not	the	goal.	The	goal	is	to	retrieve	a	useful	
set	of	artifacts	to	answer	the	research	question	fairly	[37].	
Organizational	Diversity.	
The	documents	analyzed	by	the	coders	represented	a	diverse	amount	of	
information	from	all	three	strata.	Parent	organizations	that	have	published	content	
included	in	the	final	sample	are:	Association	for	Computing	Machinery,	IEEE,	Forbes,	
Army	Research	Lab,	International	Journal	of	Critical	Infrastructure	Protection,	
Economist,	Tripwire,	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	Institute	for	Computer	
Sciences,	Social	Informatics	and	Telecommunications	Engineering,	White	House,	
Government	Accountability	Oﬃce,	Dow	Jones	and	Co.,	and	International	Federation	
for	Information	Processing.	
Coding	
Krippendorf	defines	coding	as	the	step	of	classifying	the	sampling	or	
recording	units	in	terms	of	the	categories	of	the	analytical	constructs	chosen	[37].	
The	sampling	unit	elected	to	categorize	the	information	present	in	the	artifact	is	
“the	sentence”	[54],	because	of	its	ability	to	obtain	meaning	in	relation	to	text	[37],	
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and	due	to	the	use	of	human	coders	[30].	Each	sentence	was	read	and	coded	against	
the	code	categories	using	the	recording	unit	classification	diagram	listed	in	
Appendix	C.	Coders	were	trained	to	look	for	repetitive	material	so	as	not	to	code	the	
same	information	twice.	The	coders	were	instructed	to	interpret	the	sampling	unit	
(e.g.,	sentence)	in	the	context	of	an	entire	artifact	(e.g.,	context	unit).	This	
interpretation	is	meaningful	and	feasible	for	an	artifact	that	contains	less	than	eight	
pages	of	codeable	material	[37].	An	example	of	a	coded	artifact	is	in	Appendix	D.	
Content	Categories.	
The	Maxqda	graphical	user	interface	provides	a	visual	display	of	code	
categories	and	coded	material	to	check	operational	definitions	against	sampling	
units,	as	displayed	in	Figure	6.		
	
Figure	6:	Maxqda	Graphical	User	Interface 
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The	“Not	Applicable”	code	category	was	included	in	addition	to	the	existing	a	
priori	categories	of	complexity,	dynamism	and	munificence	to	ensure	
exhaustiveness	[30,	54].	All	forces	discussed	relate	to	the	general	external	
environment.	Table	8	lists	the	code	categories.	
	
Table	8.		Code	Category	Definitions	
Code	Category	 Sub		Category	 Definitions	
Complexity	 Forces	interconnecting	 Are	 the	forces	interconnecting?	
(CONNECTEDNESS)	
Complexity	 Forces	not	connecting	 Are	 the	forces	disconnected?	
(CONNECTEDNESS)	
Complexity	 Many	 forces	 Are	 the	forces	many?	(AMOUNT)	
Complexity	 Few	forces	 Are	 the	forces	few?	 (AMOUNT)	
Complexity	 Forces	are	strong	 Are	 the	forces	strong?	
(STRENGTH)	
Complexity	 Forces	are	weak	 Are	 the	forces	weak?	
(STRENGTH)	
Dynamism	 Forces	change	a	 lot	 Is	there	a	high	amount	of	change?	
(AMOUNT)	
Dynamism	 Forces	change	infrequently Are	 forces	changing	very	little?	
(AMOUNT)	
Dynamism	 Forces	change	fast	 Is	change	happening	quickly?	
(SPEED)	
Dynamism	 Forces	change	slowly	 Is	change	happening	slowly?	
(SPEED)	
Munificence	 Resources	are	scarce	 Are	 the	amount	of	resources	
available	scarce?	(AMOUNT)	
Munificence	 Resources	are	in	
abundance	
Are	 the	amount	of	resources	
available	abundant?	(AMOUNT)	
Not	 Applicable	 Not	 Applicable	 All		other	sentences	 (N/A)	
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Coder	Training.	
Qualitative	data	analysis	software	(Maxqda)	was	selected	for	the	ability	to	
manage	large	volumes	of	text,	display	information	with	ease	and	for	working	with	
multiple	coders	[52].	The	content	analyst	familiarized	the	coders	with	Maxqda,	
operational	definitions	and	code	categories	(see	Appendix	E).	Also,	well‐defined	
explicit	coding	instructions	were	written	into	Maxqda	to	improve	coding	
consistency	[54].	Only	the	content	analyst	trained	and	evaluated	each	coder	[37].	
They	participated	in	a	beta	coding	session	to	improve	coding	consistency	and	to	
minimize	idiosyncratic	judgments	in	the	coding	process	[37].	The	training	process	
produced	favorable	reliability	results.	The	coders	trained	on	documents	not	
included	in	the	final	sample.	No	collaboration	amongst	the	coders	was	allowed	
during	the	coding	process.		
Three	graduate	students	with	a	strong	background	in	cyber	coded	the	
documents.	The	importance	of	coders	being	familiar	with	the	phenomena	under	
consideration	was	a	critical	factor	in	coder	selection	[37].	The	reading	level	of	the	
documents	demanded	coders	with	a	higher	education	level.	
Data	Reduction	
Once	the	coders	finished,	the	completed	thumb	drives	were	given	to	the	
content	analyst	to	aggregate.	The	combined	data	sets	generated	numerous	
descriptive	statistics,	charts,	and	tables.	The	content	analyst	scrutinized	the	data	for	
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outliers,	incomplete	artifacts,	and	other	anomalies.	All	of	the	artifacts	were	deemed	
complete	and	properly	coded.	The	data	were	imported	into	Microsoft	Excel	to	look	
for	analysis	of	patterns	and	trends	within	and	across	the	set.	Numerous	graphs	and	
tables	were	collapsed	into	a	tight	set	which	best	articulated	the	findings.		
Validity	
Every	step	of	the	research	process	was	conducted	to	ensure	the	quality	of	the	
results	led	to	an	acceptance	of	truth.	The	guidelines	set	forth	by	Klaus	Krippendorﬀ	
[37]	for	validity	in	content	analysis	were	followed	and	reviewed	periodically	
throughout	the	research	process.	
Reliability	
To	ensure	valid	inferences	from	the	text,	word	meaning	and	category	
definitions	were	tightened,	multiple	coders	were	used	and	intercoder	agreement	
was	calculated.	Cohens	Kappa	[14]	was	calculated	as	a	measure	of	reliability.	It	is	
considered	a	strict	measure	of	agreement	between	coders	based	on	the	selection	of	
a	particular	code	for	the	recording	unit	[42].	
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IV.		Analysis	and	Results	
Descriptive	Statistics	
Table	9	shows	the	coding	units	range	from	1,594	to	2,067	(mean=1,838).	The	
primary	reason	for	this	variance	lies	in	how	each	coder	interpreted	the	coding	unit.	
The	ambiguity	of	the	language	in	the	published	material	might	cause	one	coder	to	
perceive	the	presence	of	a	coding	unit	while	another	did	not.	
Table	9.		Total	Codes	by	Coder	
	 Coder
	 1	 2	 3	
Pages	 156	 156	 156	
Documents	 20	 20	 20	
Coding	units 2067 1853	 1594
	
Table	10	shows	that	each	coder	read	156	pages,	which	averaged	7.8	pages	
per	artifact.	Although	there	were	more	academic	artifacts	than	government,	the	
government	artifacts	averaged	more	pages	(13.8).	Subsequently,	the	diﬃculty	of	
interpreting	the	sampling	unit	(sentence)	in	relation	to	the	context	unit	(artifact)	
increased	[37].	
	
Table	10.		Pages	Coded	by	Strata	
	 Academic	 Government Private/Practitioner	 Aggregate
Pages	Read	 74	 69	 13	 156	
Pages	Per	Artifact									7.4	 13.8	 2.6	 7.8	
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Flesch‐Kincaid		Reading		Level	and	Flesch	Reading		Ease	measures	were	
calculated	for	each	artifact.	Table	11	shows	the	results.	The	Flesch‐Kincaid	formulas	
are	mathematical	derivations	accounting	for	the	amount	of	words	in	a	sentence	and	
syllables	per	word	to	generate	a	grade	level	guide	for	comprehension	and	ease	of	
reading	[26,	35].	The	total	pages	coded	were	156,	with	an	average	1,838	recordable	
units	at	a	graduate	reading	level	and	ease	(Flesch‐Kincaid	Grade	16/Ease	23).	The	
government	documents	emerged	as	the	most	diﬃcult	to	comprehend	based	on	
these	indices	and	suﬀered	the	highest	amount	of	disagreement.	
Table	11.		Flesch‐Kincaid	Reading	Scores	
Strata	 Reading	Level	 Reading	Ease	
Academic	 16	 24	
Government	 17	 15	
Private/Practitioner	 16	 27	
Total	Average	 16	 23	
 
Intercoder	Agreement	
Based	on	Landis	and	Koch	[38],	the	coder	agreement	in	Table	12	ranges	from	
fair	(21%‐40%)	to	substantial	(61%‐80%)	which	results	in	moderate	overall	
agreement	with	Kappa	ranging	from	51%‐60%.	Several	factors	can	aﬀect	Kappa	
(e.g.,	amount	of	categories	(13),	specificity	of	definition);	since	the	research	is	
exploratory,	lower	levels	of	agreement	are	considered	acceptable	[42].	Coders	were	
allowed	considerable	latitude	in	content	interpretation	based	on	their	expertise	and	
training.	Despite	challenges,	the	results	indicate	agreement	between	coders.	
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Table	12.		Cohens	Kappa	
	 	 Coders	 	 	
	 1	and	2	 1	and	3	 2	and	3	 Mean	
Academic	 0.66	 0.71	 0.71	 0.69	
Government	 0.39	 0.47	 0.29	 0.38	
Private/Practitioner	 0.36	 0.51	 0.31	 0.40	
Kappa	 0.52	 0.60	 0.51	 0.54	
 
Code	Distribution	
Table	13	lists	the	frequency	distribution	of	codes	across	the	sample	(n=60).	
The	coders	assigned	a	dimensional	code	to	51.8%	of	the	content	(2,856	sentences).	
The	category	“not	applicable”	was	removed	from	the	frequency	analysis	in	Table	13	
to	remove	bias.	The	frequency	analysis	indicates	that	complexity	has	a	strong	
presence	(more	than	91%)	in	each	stratum.	Complexity	(e.g.,	forces	connecting,	
many	forces,	forces	are	strong)	accounts	for	67.43%	of	uncertainty	in	the	content	
coded.	Dynamism	(e.g.,	amount	of	change	is	high,	forces	change	fast)	accounts	for	
8.12%	of	uncertainty	in	the	content	coded.	Munificence	(e.g.,	resources	are	scarce)	
accounts	for	5.85%	of	uncertainty	in	the	content	coded.	Based	on	coder	
interpretation,	as	Figure	7	indicates,	there	is	a	strong	presence	(81.4%)	of	
uncertainty	in	the	general	external	environment	present	across	the	three	strata	
sampled.	
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Table	13.		Frequency	Analysis	of	Codes	
Parent	code	 Code	 Frequency	 Percent	 Documents	
Complexity	 Forces	Connecting	 872	 30.53	 56	
Complexity	 Many	Forces	 537	 18.80	 55	
Complexity	 Forces	are	Strong	 517	 18.10	 58	
Munificence	 Resources	are	in	Abundance	 225	 7.88	 36	
Munificence	 Resources	are	Scarce	 167	 5.85	 44	
Dynamism	 Amount	of	Change	is	High	 144	 5.04	 44	
Complexity	 Forces	Not	Connecting	 140	 4.90	 32	
Dynamism	 Forces	Change	Fast	 88	 3.08	 25	
Dynamism	 Forces	Change	Slowly	 65	 2.28	 20	
Complexity	 Forces	are	Weak	 57	 2.00	 29	
Dynamism	 Amount	of	Change	is	Low	 34	 1.19	 11	
Complexity	 Few	Forces	 10	 0.35	 8	
	 Total	 2,856	 100.00	 ‐	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	7.		Uncertainty	in	the	General	External	Environment	
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Strata	Analysis	
The	following	sections	will	provide	an	analysis	of	the	presence	of	uncertainty	
in	the	general	external	environment,	within	and	across	strata,	displayed	in	Figure	8.		
	
	
Complexity.	
Figure	8	illustrates	there	is	strong	evidence	to	support	that	complexity	is	
extremely	high.	All	three	strata	showed	a	strong	presence	of	complexity	in	the	
general	external	environment.	In	fact,	the	data	appears	to	be	a	statistical	dead‐heat	
at	about	90%.	
Dynamism.	
Dynamism	presents	a	diﬀerent	picture.	Private/practitioner	displays	
significantly	higher	uncertainty	than	government	and	academic	strata.	This	level	of	
Figure	8.		Percentage	of	Uncertainty	by	Dimension	and	Strata 
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uncertainty	appears	to	be	reasonable	because	of	the	increased	competition	and	
desire	for	revenue	present	in	the	private/practitioner	environment.	This	
environment	requires	the	ability	to	dissolve	or	create	organizations	rapidly,	modify	
processes,	and	innovate	in	response	to	market	stimuli.	
The	government	strata	exhibit	a	lower	presence	of	uncertainty.	Unlike	
private/practitioner,	government	functions	are	slow	to	change.	Despite	this,	coders	
agree	there	is	vastly	more	change	(dynamism)	in	the	general	external	environment	
across	all	three	strata.	In	fact,	the	amount	of	change	was	detected	at	four	times	the	
frequency	(see	Table	13).	
Munificence.	
It	is	clear	from	the	results	there	is	explanatory	power	and	a	measurable	
degree	of	resource	scarcity	(munificence)	in	the	environment.	The	presence	of	
uncertainty	is	lower	overall	across	all	three	environmental	resource	measures.	
However,	the	academic	strata	exhibit	significantly	more	perceived	resource	scarcity	
in	the	general	external	environment.	A	reasonable	explanation	for	the	diﬀerence	is	
the	breadth	and	depth	of	research	the	academic	sector	dedicates	to	this	complex	
area.		
 	
 40 
 
 
Coder	Analysis	
Figure	9	clearly	demonstrates	the	coders	were	consistent	in	their	coding	
across	all	three	dimensions	of	uncertainty.	While	there	is	slight	disagreement	in	
munificence	(resource)	and	complexity	(amount/connectedness	of	forces),	there	is	
general	agreement	overall.		
 
Recommendations	for	Action	
Understanding	the	outcomes	presented	in	this	study,	it	would	be	logical	to	
structure	government	cyber	organizations	operating	in	the	critical	infrastructure	
environment	in	an	organic	fashion	rather	than	the	current	mechanistic	structure.	
The	government	should	generate	separate	processes	in	the	creation	of	these	
Figure	9.		Coder	Overlap 
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organizations	to	allow	for	fast	implementation	and	frequent	modification.	These	
cyber	organizations	should	have	the	following	characteristics	if	they	are	to	succeed:	
 People	do	not	perform	highly	specialized	tasks	but	have	a	broader	view.	
 A	chain	of	command	exists	but	is	more	decentralized	because	of	the	need	for	
shifting	responsibilities.	
 The	high	level	of	complexity	and	change	in	the	environment	warrants	
knowledgeable	personnel	working	in	teams	and	coordinating	frequently	to	
make	fast	decisions	when	needed.	
 Communication	often	occurs	and	at	many	levels.	
 Orders	and	directives	diminish	as	advice	and	information	sharing	increase.	
 Knowledge	and	expertise	increase	individual	status.	
	
One	of	the	most	appealing	aspects	of	the	research	is	the	potential	for	
generalizability	to	other	cyber	organizations	operating	within	the	United	States	and	
similarly	developed	countries.	One	could	make	the	argument	that	the	cyber	
environments	of	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	the	Department	of	Defense,	
private	utility	companies,	and	high	technology	firms	have	significant	similarities.	
	 It	is	worth	mentioning	that	significant	barriers	exist	to	implementing	these	
principles	in	the	DoD	and	other	government	agencies	ranging	from	culture	to	
strategic	direction.	Understanding	the	connections	between	organizational	
performance,	structure,	and	the	environment	should	act	as	an	impetus	for	these	
difficult	changes.	 	
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V.		Conclusions	
Conclusions	of	Research	
Few	topics	within	the	area	of	national	interest	are	more	important	than	the	
understanding	of	how	to	organize	in	cyber	and	protect	national	critical	
infrastructure	assets	from	cyberspace	threats.	Participation	at	the	United	States	
Army	Cyber	Talks	at	the	National	Defense	University	in	September	of	2015	served	
to	strengthen	the	need	for	empirical	analysis	and	evidence	that	could	lead	to	
organizational	structuring	decisions	and	adjustments.	Innovation	and	knowledge	
management	were	direct	concerns	of	attendees,	which	relate	directly	to	
organizational	structure	[40].	Several	structural	dimensions	were	repeatedly	
discussed	as	inhibitors	to	performance	further	validating	the	need	for	this	research.	
The	three	research	questions	answered	in	this	study	were:		
1. What	is	organizational	structure?	
Answer:	The	research	literature	depicts	organizational	structure	in	two	
dimensions:	structural	and	contextual.	The	contextual	dimensions	
significantly	affect	the	structural	dimensions.		
2. What	theories	contribute	to	organizational	structure?		
Answer:	Institutional	isomorphism,	resource	dependence,	population	
ecology,	and	structural	contingency	are	dominant	organizational	theories	
that	contribute	to	the	explanation	of	organizational	structure.	Of	these	
four	theories,	structural	contingency	provides	a	pragmatic	explanation	of	
how	to	structure	organizations	based	on	context	and	contingency.	The	
environment	emerges	as	a	prominent	point	of	focus	in	every	dominant	
theory.	The	level	of	uncertainty	with	regard	to	the	organization's	general	
external	environment	shows	a	strong	connection	to	structural	type.			
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3. How	should	organizations	structure	in	cyber	environments	to	defend	
critical	infrastructure?	
Answer:	The	perceived	level	of	uncertainty,	as	measured	by	the	degree	of	
complexity,	dynamism,	and	munificence	in	the	external	environment	of	
cyber	organizations	relates	well	to	the	mechanistic	and	organic	structural	
continuum.	Cyber	organizations	should	structure	organically	in	highly	
uncertain	environments	and	mechanistically	in	less	uncertain	
environments.		
	
As	it	pertains	to	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	environment,	
forces	within	and	across	strata	are	overwhelmingly	numerous,	strong	and	
connecting.	The	amount	of	change	at	present	is	very	high.	The	speed	of	change	is	
fast	and	resources	are	typified	by	an	abundance	of	information	technology	with	low	
barriers	to	entry	creating	opportunity	and	availability	for	adversary	and	ally	alike.	
These	elements	create	the	perception	of	a	highly	uncertain	situation	for	
organizations	operating	in	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	environment.	
Organic	structuring	principles	allow	for	the	adaptability	and	flexibility	this	
environment	requires.	This	research	indicates	organizations	should	follow	organic	
structuring	principles	while	operating	in	the	cyber‐connected	critical	infrastructure	
environment.	
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Recommendations	for	Future	Research	
Measure	Government	Cyber	Organizations.	
This	research	approached	answering	the	question	of	how	to	structure	
organizations	in	cyberspace	by	first	analyzing	the	contextual	dimension	of	external	
environmental	uncertainty.	It	will	now	be	appropriate	and	helpful	to	measure	
empirically	structural	dimensions	of	government	cyber	organizations	(e.g.,	DHS	ICS‐
CERT,	USCYBERCOM),	to	contribute	further	to	the	answer.		
Replicate	the	Study.	
This	research	focused	on	the	U.S.	only.	However	the	U.S.	is	not	the	only	
country	in	need	of	strategic	direction	in	the	creation	of	cyber	organizations	tasked	
to	protect	critical	infrastructure.	A	replicative	study	for	other	allied	nations	who	
mutually	support	cyber	alongside	the	U.S.	(Great	Britain,	Australia,	Canada,	and	New	
Zealand),	would	contribute	to	the	overall	security	of	each	nation.		
Identify	Dominant	Factors	for	Munificence.	
Munificence	(resource)	in	this	research	is	broadly	defined.	With	the	insight	
gained	from	this	study,	it	is	apparent	that	resource	in	cyber	would	benefit	from	
structural	equation	modeling	(e.g.,	confirmatory	factor	analysis).	This	research	will	
aid	in	the	identification	of	dominant	resource	factors	in	the	cyber‐connected	critical	
infrastructure	environment.		
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Appendix	B.		Artifacts	Meeting	Selection	Criteria		
A	A	Survey	of	SCADA	and	Critical	Infrastructure	Incidents	
A	A	Taxonomy	of	Cyber	Attacks	on	SCADA	Systems	
A	A	Web‐Based	Remote	Lab	for	SCADA	
A	Advanced	Key	for	Secure	SCADA	
A	Capabilities	of	Dynamic	Reconfiguration	MB	ICS	
A	CI	Dependency	Assessment	
A	Creating	a	Cyber	Moving	Target	for	CI	
A	Critical	Infrastructure	Dependencies	
A	Cyber	CI	Protect	Payload	Anomaly	Detection	
A	Cyber	Security	Risk	Assessment	for	SCADA	and	DCS	Networks	2007	ISA	Transactions	
A	Decentralized	Risk	Management	CI	
A	Detecting	Intrusions	in	SCADA	Systems	
A	Event	Triggered	Strat	IC	S	
A	FPGAs	in	Industrial	Control	Applications	
A	GSM	SMS	Based	Monitoring	Control	Systems	
A	Improving	Security	for	SCADA	Control	Systems	
A	Intrusion	Detection	in	SCADA	
A	Methodologies	and	Applications	for	CI	
A	Network	Intrusion	Detection	M0DBUS	ICS	
A	Networked	Control	System	Overview	and	Research	Trends	
A	Probabilistic	Risk	in	CI	
A	Public	Private	CI	
A	Rethinking	Security	Properties	SCADA	
A	SCADA	Security	in	Light	of	Cyber	Warfare	
A	SCADA	Testbed	
A	Security	lssues	in	SCADA	Networks	
A	Security	Retrofit	for	SCADA	
A	Security	Strategies	for	SCADA	Networks	
A	State	of	the	Art	in	CI	Protection	
A	Stealthy	Deception	Attacks	on	Water	SCADA	Systems	
A	The	Cyber	Threat	Landscape	Challenges	and	Future	Research	Directions	Computers	Security	
A	The	SCADA	Challenge	Securing	Critical	Infrastructure	2009	Network	Security	
A	Wind	Turbines	SCADA	
A	Winn	Honeypots	
P	Americas	CI	is	vulnerable	to	Cyber	Forbes	
P	Automation	World	scada‐attacks‐double‐2014	
P	Crashing	the	System	CI	The	Economist	
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P	Critical	Infrastructure	Security	Vulnerability	Tripwire	
P	CSIS	Insuring	ICS	Security	
P	Cyberattacks	Escalate	CI	Homeland	Sec	Today	
P	DHS	Phishing	CI	The	Hill	
P	In	the	Crossfire	
P	McAfee	In	the	Dark	Private	CI	View	
P	McAfee	on	CI	General	
P	Protecting	the	Nations	CI	from	Cyber	
P	SANS	ICS	CI	Response	
P	Study	Half	of	CI	pros	Attack	SC	Magazine	
P	Survey	Reveals	CI	Issues	
P	Trend	Micro‐	Report	on	Cybersecurity	and	Critical	Infrastructure	in	the	Americas	
P	Verizon	Data	Breach	
P	Verizon	Energy	CI	
G	Army	Research	Lab	ICS	Security	
G	CI	Assessment	Smart	Grid	Security	
G	Cyber	Threats	from	CRI	Protecting	CI	
G	DHS	IG	Secure	ICS	
G	DHS	Strategy	for	Securing	Control	Systems	
G	DHS	Year	End	Assessment	
G	Executive	Order	Improving	CI	Cybersecurity	
G	GAO	CI	Protect	Observations	
G	GAO	Maritime	CI	Protection	
G	GAO‐15‐290,	High‐Risk	Series	CI		
G	ICS	Summary	Report	
G	Identifying,	Understanding,	and	Analyzing	CI	Interdepend	
G	NIST	cybersecurity	framework	
G	NIST	Guide	to	ICS	Security	2008	
G	NIST	Guide	to	Industrial	Control	Systems	Security	2011	
G	PPD	CI	Security	
G	Presidential	Cyberspace	Policy	Review	
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